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Abstract 
This informational paper discusses the risk assessment 
process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload 
Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace 
System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management 
framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to 
these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating 
security controls. This process builds upon earlier work 
performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk 
assessment methodology and to identify categories of 
information security risks that pose a significant impact to 
aeronautical communications systems. A description of the 
deviations from the typical process is described in regards to 
this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive 
nature of the information, data resulting from the risk 
assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Introduction 
Overview 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) integration into the 
National Airspace System (NAS) represents many new 
challenges in aviation. One of the challenges is the 
development of a new command and control communication 
system capable of providing reliable, safe, secure, routine 
operation of an unmanned aircraft (UA). Additional 
challenges associated with the development of a new 
command and control communication system include the 
assignment of a dedicated frequency spectrum, the 
development of a communications datalink, and the security 
testing and certification of the communications system. RTCA 
Special Committee 203 (SC 203) identified this new UAS 
command and control communication system as the Control 
and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) system. The 
purpose of the CNPC system is to exchange information 
between the UA and the UAS Control Element (CE) to ensure 
safe, secure, and reliable communications. Figure 1 shows the 
various elements that comprise the Unmanned Aircraft System 
(Ref. 1). The CNPC is part of the Communications Element. 
The risk assessment was guided by federal standards, so as 
the CNPC system evolves the FAA could utilize this 
assessment as a contributing component of a final assessment 
and eventual CNPC system certification. The federal standards 
were authorized by The Federal Information Systems 
Management Act (FISMA). FISMA tasked the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with the 
responsibility for developing standards that provide security of 
federal information systems. The standards shall include 
information security standards necessary to improve the 
security of federal information systems. The risk assessment 
contains the results of a security risk assessment conducted on 
a notional CNPC system supporting the operations of UAS in 
the NAS. The risk assessment followed the guidelines found 
in the NIST Special Publication 800-30 (July 2002) Risk 
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems 
(Ref. 2) and NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Revision 3 
August 2009) Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations (Ref. 3). This 
assessment process builds upon earlier work performed by 
RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 to define candidate 
architectures and its ad-hoc security sub-group to suggest 
following a NIST-based risk assessment methodology 
(Ref. 4). We concur with (Ref. 4) that a NIST-based risk 
assessment methodology was the most logical choice to follow as: 
 
 NIST standards and guidelines are developed from 
commercial best practices. 
 While NIST standards are required for all government 
systems, they are free for the private sector to use. 
 The FAA’s Security Certification and Authorization 
Package (SCAP) already implements the NIST 
standards and guidelines.  
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Figure 1.—Unmanned aircraft system elements (Ref. 1). 
Purpose 
The risk assessment identified the threats, vulnerabilities, 
inherent risks, and the controls that may be used to mitigate 
the risks encountered in a notional CNPC system. It provides a 
basis in which core architectures, standards, and technologies 
may be evaluated in a consistent manner in regard to security. 
The risk assessment process provided a thorough qualitative 
and quantitative evaluation of threat-sources, vulnerabilities, 
risks, and controls associated with both our conceptual, as well 
as envisioned future, CNPC systems. Due to the sensitive 
nature of this information, data resulting from the risk 
assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Although the details of a 
specific, final implementation may differ in some aspects, the 
effort allows for the selection, evaluation, and verification of a 
substantial portion of the security components anticipated in 
those future CNPC systems. The format and content of the risk 
assessment may be used as the foundation for risk assessments 
by system implementers, certifying authorities or agencies 
when the final CNPC systems are constructed.  
Figure 2 shows the common Risk Assessment Methodology 
as documented in NIST SP 800-30 (Ref. 2). It became 
apparent in the early stages of this effort that an operational, or 
even early-development, model of a system architected and 
built for certification under the future FAA and RTCA 
standards existed. Several assumptions and a few process 
adjustments were necessary as we exercised the NIST 
framework. We also acknowledge that while we are aware of 
the many examples of public and military UAS operating by 
exception within the NAS, we did not feel these provided a 
suitable likeness for an analysis of how future civil UAS 
would be operated. Military CNPC systems are proprietary, 
rely on separate spectrum allocations, utilize cryptography not 
available for civilian use, and details about the systems are 
largely unavailable to the general public.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.—Risk assessment methodology flowchart (Ref. 2). 
Methodology 
System Characterization 
Scope 
The development of civil UAS routinely flying in the NAS 
is still in its early stages. No civil UAs are routinely flying in 
the NAS at present. The UAs that are flying in the NAS are 
primarily military, federal government, test and development 
aircraft owned by private companies, or universities flying 
under exception. These UAS utilize either military or 
proprietary communications systems specifically tailored to 
their mission’s scope. No FAA authorized communication 
system for UAs currently exists, so the analysis conducted in 
the risk assessment process was based on a baseline 
architecture of a notional CNPC system. The architectures of 
these CNPC systems were derived from RTCA Inc.’s, SC-203 
Issue Paper, UAS Control and Communications Architectures 
(Ref. 5) and European Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA) 
Inception Report of the Preliminary Impact Assessment on 
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the Safety of Communications for Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) (Ref. 6). The baseline architecture consists of a CNPC 
system utilizing wireless datalinks along with optional wired 
terrestrial components. It is assumed that a real-time computer 
operating system with a protocol specific to the UAS is used 
to generate the data communications necessary and that the 
data will be transmitted via wired and/or wireless systems. 
The CNPC system may be point-to-point, line of sight, or 
transmitted through a series of ground stations and/or satellite 
system. It is from this notional CNPC system that threats, 
vulnerabilities, likelihoods, impacts and risk were derived.  
The risk assessment identifies two baseline communications 
architectures, direct and networked, for supporting the CNPC 
system. These baseline architectures are designed for use in 
the study, development, and evaluation of the security controls 
needed to secure communications between the various types 
of unmanned aircraft (UA), the associated control element 
(CE), and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) facilities. UAs are being developed in 
various sizes with different operating altitudes, airspeeds and 
communications requirements, each presenting unique 
demands on the communication architectures. A conceptual 
architecture attempts to reduce these various communications 
architectures into two baseline architectures from which a 
communications security risk assessment can be performed. 
The architecture displayed in Figure 3 shows a direct CNPC 
communications path between the CE and the UA for line of 
sight (LOS) communications or direct CNPC communications 
path between the CE and the UA via a satellite system for 
beyond line of sight (BLOS) operations. Redundant paths 
implementing both LOS and BLOS may also be used to 
enhance communications reliability and range. In this 
architecture, ATC/Air Traffic Services (ATS) communications 
may be relayed through the UA to the CE as part of the CNPC 
or direct to the CE via ground or non-UA airborne 
communications links. 
The architecture shown in Figure 4 uses an aeronautical 
communication service provider network to supply the 
primary CNPC links between the CE and the UA. The 
communications service provider network may be supplied by 
a third party, the UA owner/company or the FAA and provides 
a network of communications services within a small to global 
geographic area. The details of these services are not defined 
here but are considered a potential service offering in the 
future to support LOS and BLOS CNPC communications on a 
large scale. Redundant paths from the FAA facilities and CE 
to/from the service provider network may be used to enhance 
the availability of the communications links. 
The CNPC system is a data link comprised of several 
functions needed for the safe operation of a UA. Several of the 
functions can be combined depending on the capabilities of 
the UA and or its operational function. The following 
functions make up the CNPC data link: Telecommand Data, 
Telemetry Data, Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) Data, Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) Voice Relay, Air Traffic Services 
(ATS) Data Relay, Target Data, Airborne Weather Data and   
 
 
 
Figure 3.—UAS direct control and non-payload 
communications (CNPC) security baseline 
architecture. 
 
 
Figure 4.—UAS networked control and non-payload 
(CNPC) security baseline architecture. 
 
Non-Payload Video Data for safety of flight. Figure 5 shows 
the expected normal Communications, Navigation, and  
Surveillance functions associated with the operation of an 
unmanned aircraft in the NAS (Ref. 7). The figure also shows 
the relationship of the data to the primary elements that 
comprise a UAS. The CNPC data link connects the UA to its 
CE and associated Air Traffic Services (ATS). 
Communications with the support element (SE) pertains to 
transport, maintenance and launch of the UA; it is not part of 
the CNPC. 
The risk assessment process includes evaluating the security 
of the CNPC and ATC/ATS information sent to and from: the 
UAS control element, the unmanned aircraft element, the 
FAA’s ATC/ATS facilities, and the satellite and/or network 
service providers. While securing the physical facilities 
associated with UAS operation is an important contributor to 
the overall security of the entire system, it was deemed outside 
the scope of the current CNPC risk assessment. Since threats 
from the environment, utilities, and other natural or manmade 
sources are unique to specific system implementations and 
operating environments, they could not be properly evaluated 
as part of the notional CNPC architecture. As our focus was to 
concentrate on the expected technical aspects of the CNPC 
security, organizational policies and procedures that would 
enhance the security posture of a UAS were also considered 
outside the scope of the evaluation. In a risk assessment of an 
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Figure 5.—Overall view of system inputs and outputs (Ref. 7). 
 
operational system seeking certification from a governing 
authority, such as the FAA, we fully acknowledge that these 
aspects would play a crucial role in defining the system’s 
security architecture.  
Security Categorization 
Security categorization is the characterization of 
information systems and information types based on 
assessment of the potential impact that a loss of 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of such information 
and information types would have on organizational 
operations, organizational assets, or individuals (Ref. 8).  
Security categorization of an information system begins 
with the identification of the parts (information types) that 
make up the system, continues by performing an analysis of 
the impact the loss of confidentially, integrity and availability 
has on the information types and ends with a “high-water 
mark” analysis of the information types upon the system as a 
whole. The highest impact on the information types becomes 
the impact for that information type on the information 
system. This information is then used during the system’s risk 
analysis process to select the minimum security controls for 
the information system. The security categorization process is 
described in the Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication 199 (FIPS PUB 199) and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 800-60.  
A security categorization was conducted on the notional 
CNPC information system described above and its individual 
functions (information types). The information types identified 
for the categorization process are the seven functions of the 
CNPC system: Telecommand Data, Telemetry Data, 
Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) Data, Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) Voice Relay, Air Traffic Services (ATS) Data Relay, 
Target Data, Airborne Weather Data and Non-Payload Video 
Data. The impact of losing confidentiality, integrity or 
availability of each information type was evaluated. An impact 
of Low, Moderate, or High was assigned to the loss of 
confidentially, integrity and availability of each information 
type based on the definitions found in FIPS PUB 199. The 
highest impact value for confidentiality, integrity and 
availability then becomes the overall security categorization 
impact level for the information type. This process delivered 
an overall security categorization for each information type 
based on the formula below. 
 
SCinformation type = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, 
impact), (availability, impact)}  
 
Once the security categorization of the information types 
was completed, a security categorization for the overall CNPC 
information system was conducted. The security 
categorization for the CNPC system was determined by 
selecting the highest impact value for each information type. 
The highest impact value for confidentiality, integrity and 
availability then becomes the overall security categorization 
impact level for the CNPC information system. The 
generalized format for expressing the Security Categorization 
for the CNPC System is: 
 
SCCNPC System = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, 
impact), (availability, impact)} 
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The resulting impact level from the security categorization 
of the CNPC system was then used to identify the appropriate 
baseline security controls needed to mitigate the risks 
identified during the risk analysis process. 
Risk Identification 
Risk is defined as the overall negative impact to the system 
when considering the probability that a vulnerability is 
exploited by a threat-source. 
The risk identification phase of the risk assessment is the 
process by which risks to the system are identified and 
prioritized so that system owners are able to make a 
determination on how to allocate resources to mitigate overall 
impact to the system. Risk identification involves identifying 
threat sources, system vulnerabilities, and determining the 
probability that a known vulnerability can be exploited by the 
threat-source based upon inherent system controls. 
Threat Identification 
A threat is the potential for a particular threat-source to 
successfully exercise a particular vulnerability (Ref. 2). A 
known threat-source does not present a risk when there is no 
vulnerability that can be exploited within the system.  
Threat-sources for a specific system are identified as any 
circumstance or event that can cause harm to the system. In 
assessing threat-sources, it is important to consider all threat-
sources that can harm the system and its processing 
environment. During the assessment process, we investigated 
threats related to both a general information technology 
communications system and, more specifically, aeronautical 
communications systems. Using these threats as a baseline, we 
were able to extract a list of likely threat-sources that would 
impact our notional CNPC system. 
The threat statement produced from this step of the process 
was created to provide a description of the anticipated threat 
types that can cause an adverse effect on the system.  
Vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability is a weakness in the system that can be 
exploited either intentionally or accidentally. The goal of this 
step was to develop a list of the system vulnerabilities (flaws 
or weaknesses) that could be exploited by the potential threat-
sources (Ref. 2). The identification of vulnerabilities can take 
many forms based on various types of risk assessments. For 
the purposes of this risk assessment, we compiled a list of 
common information technology (IT) and communications-
related system vulnerabilities that applied to our notional UAS 
CNPC system. Once an actual system is under development, 
these vulnerabilities would need to be re-evaluated to reflect 
the configuration of the implemented operational system and 
the operating environment. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.—Link between likelihood, impact, and risk (Ref. 2). 
Risks 
Risk is the likelihood that a threat-source exploits a 
vulnerability and that it in turn results in an adverse impact to 
the system.  
The risk analysis for each vulnerability consists of assessing 
the threats and compensating controls to determine the 
likelihood that vulnerability could be exploited and the 
potential impact should the vulnerability be exploited. A 
general depiction of the analysis is shown in Figure 6, where 
risk is the intersection of a threat and vulnerability, influenced 
by likelihood and impact. 
Essentially, risk is proportional to both likelihood of 
exploitation and possible impact. 
Determination of threat and vulnerability pairing was 
accomplished by analyzing each vulnerability classification 
and applying a threat source to determine if the threat source 
pertained to the vulnerability. This iterative process of 
identifying relevant threat and vulnerability pairings resulted 
in the creation of a table of system risks. 
Control Analysis 
The goal of this step is to analyze the controls that have 
been implemented, or are planned for implementation, by the 
organization to minimize the adverse effect of the risk to the 
system. Security controls encompass the use of technical and 
non-technical methods. Technical controls are safeguards that 
are incorporated into computer hardware, software, or 
firmware (e.g., access control mechanisms, identification and 
authentication mechanisms, encryption methods, intrusion 
detection software). Non-technical controls are management 
and operational controls such as security policies, operational 
procedures, and personnel, physical, and environmental 
security (Ref. 2). 
Security controls used for the risk assessment were defined 
in NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Revision 3 August 2009) 
Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations (Ref. 3). 
For the purposes of the evaluation, given that the system is 
in a pre-development phase, we determined a list of likely 
applicable inherent system security controls that would be 
included in a commonly deployed system using commodity 
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equipment and software. For example, basic account 
management functionality is an inherent security control found 
in all modern operating systems that would likely be deployed 
for use in a UAS CNPC system. 
Likelihood Determination 
Likelihood is the probability that a given vulnerability will 
be exploited in a threat environment and is determined by 
analyzing the effectiveness of existing (in this case inherent) 
controls against the threat-source’s capability and motivation 
as well as the nature of the vulnerability. Existing controls 
consist of safeguards in place that effectively reduce the 
access to, or successful execution of, a given vulnerability by 
a threat-source. While determining threat source motivation is 
somewhat subjective, this is only one part of the “likelihood 
determination”. 
Each documented risk was evaluated against the 
standardized definitions for each level, listed in Table 1, and 
the most appropriate likelihood was selected. Numerical 
values for the likelihood are assigned based on the NIST SP 
800-30 recommended approach, which is: High (1), Medium 
(0.5), and Low (0.1). These values provide quantitative 
assignments of likelihood that are then utilized in the 
remaining steps to calculate the risk in a more precise manner 
than afforded by purely qualitative means. 
 
TABLE 1.—LIKELIHOOD DEFINITIONS (REF. 2) 
Likelihood Likelihood definition 
High The threat-source is highly motivated and 
sufficiently capable, and controls to prevent the 
vulnerability from being exercised are 
ineffective. 
Medium The threat-source is motivate and capable, but 
controls are in place that may impede the 
successful exercise of the vulnerability. 
Low The threat-source lacks motivation or 
capability, or controls are in place to prevent, or 
at least significantly impede, the vulnerability 
from being exercised. 
Impact Analysis 
Impact is the resulting effect if a given vulnerability is 
successfully exploited by a threat-source. An impact to the 
system or data’s confidentiality, integrity, or availability is 
determined in accordance with the NIST SP 800-30 criteria 
and associated with the particular risk. The rationale for 
evaluating impact is that the exploit of a vulnerability with 
little or no adverse effects on the system or the data will 
typically result in a lower priority than vulnerabilities with 
higher adverse effects. 
Given that we were evaluating a notional system, we were 
still able to apply the standard impact definitions to our 
vulnerabilities. The impact definitions are not specific to any 
system design so we were able to correlate system impact to 
our threat-vulnerability pairs. The impact analysis provides 
prioritization of risk and illuminates areas for immediate 
improvement of system vulnerabilities.  
Each risk identified was evaluated against the standardized 
definitions for each level, listed in Table 2, and the most 
appropriate impact selected. The results of this analysis 
provided both an impact level and rating value. The numerical 
values are assigned based on the NIST SP 800-30 
recommended approach, which is: High (100), Medium (50), 
and Low (10). These values provided numerical assignment of 
impact that was utilized in future steps to calculate the risk in 
a more precise manner than afforded by qualitative means. 
 
TABLE 2.—IMPACT RATING DEFINITIONS (REF. 2) 
Impact Impact definition 
High Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the 
highly costly loss of major tangible assets or 
resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or 
impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or 
interest; or (3) may result in human death or 
serious injury. 
Medium Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the 
costly loss of tangible assets or resources; (2) may 
violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, 
reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human 
injury. 
Low Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the 
loss of some tangible assets or resources or (2) may 
noticeably affect an organization’s mission, 
reputation, or interest. 
Risk Determination 
Risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source 
exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting 
impact of that adverse event on the organization (Ref. 2). This 
section takes the qualitative threat-sources, vulnerabilities, and 
risks along with the quantitative likelihood and impact values 
to derive a risk level associated with the notional CNPC 
system. Determining the risk level was accomplished by 
creating a matrix of the likelihood and impact values, shown 
in Table 3, to determine a risk rating for each individual risk. 
 
TABLE 3.—LIKELIHOOD VS. IMPACT MATRIX (REF. 2) 
Threat 
likelihood 
Threat impact 
Low 
(10) 
Medium 
(50) 
High 
(100) 
High 
(1.0) 
Low 
101.0 = 10 
Medium 
501.0 = 50 
High 
1001.0 = 100 
Medium 
(0.5) 
Low 
100.5 = 5 
Medium 
500.5 = 25 
Medium 
1000.5 = 50 
Low 
(0.1) 
Low 
100.1 = 1 
Low 
500.1 = 5 
Low 
1000.1 = 10 
 
Creation of a rating scale for each individual risk allows for 
prioritization of effort during risk mitigation efforts. 
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Control Recommendations 
In this section, controls that provide mitigation of the 
identified technical risks are suggested. The assessment 
concentrated on selecting the NIST Special Publication (SP) 
800-53, Revision 1 controls most likely to provide substantial 
reductions in the likelihood or impact of an identified risk 
beyond the inherent security controls found in the base system 
(or in this case technologies). The goal of the recommended 
controls was to reduce the residual risk level of the 
implemented system and its associated data to an acceptable 
level in order to gain accreditation by certifying authorities.  
Results Documentation 
The final step of the Risk Assessment Methodology 
involves the creation of the Risk Assessment Matrix, which 
brings together an executive view of all the previous steps into 
a final summary table. This compilation of information reveals 
to interested parties the threat-sources, vulnerabilities, inherent 
and recommended controls and assessed risk of the UAS 
CNPC system. 
Conclusion 
During this risk assessment we were able to successfully 
adapt the NIST SP 800-30 Risk Assessment Methodology to a 
notional UAS CNPC architecture in the very initial stages of 
development.  To adapt the process to our needs we made 
certain assumptions regarding aspects of the system such as 
our hardware, software, communications architecture and 
interfaces, as well as drew upon information from similar IT 
and aeronautical communications systems to identify threats, 
vulnerabilities, risks, and inherent system controls that are 
likely to be present in civil UAS integrated into the NAS. 
The process allowed us to deliver a list of recommended 
security controls and enhancements for a representative 
architecture that is being fed into the follow-up work to 
develop a risk mitigation plan for the notional UAS CNPC 
system. Current work involves developing a list of 
representative products and technologies that map against the 
recommended security controls identified during the risk 
assessment so that we can perform testing with those controls 
applied in a prototype architecture. 
Finally, we feel that UAS implementers in the future should 
be able to successfully utilize this NIST risk assessment 
process by adapting it to their particular system’s environment 
in order to assist in the certification and accreditation process 
with the FAA. 
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